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Abstract 
An ongoing investigation initiated by the government of Sweden is examining the tax structure 
for private entities and persons who are owners or partners in trading companies. It investigates 
whether current tax structure is too complex, and if there is a need to simplify the current tax 
structure. Nonindustrial private forest landowners own 52 % of the forestland areas in Sweden 
(Nilsson, 2015, p. 92), and they are often running their business as private entities. It becomes 
interesting to examine which sanctions the revised tax structure could have on private entities 
that have forests revenue as part of the total revenue. The study examines the financial effects 
that the revised tax system would have compared to the current tax system through a future 
simulation. The study finds that the proposed changes in the investigation will have a negative 
effect on the total profit for nonindustrial private forest landowners. They would contribute with 
further tax funds to the government through the proposed changes, but also that the revised tax 
system might have negative effects for the overall short-term supply on Swedish wood 
products.  
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Sammanfattning 
En pågående utredning initierad av Regeringskansliet utreder skatteregler för enskilda 
näringsidkare och fysiska personer som är ägare eller delägare i handelsbolag. Utredningen 
undersöker huruvida avsättningsmöjligheterna är för komplexa, och om det nuvarande 
skattesystem bör förenklas. Privata skogsägare äger tillsammans 52 % av den totala 
skogsarealen i Sverige (Nilsson, 2015, p. 92), och den vanligaste företagsformen för dessa är 
enskild firma. Vilket har gett intresset till att undersöka vilka påföljder det reviderade 
skattesystemet kan få för enskilda firmor som har skog som en del av intäkten. Studien försöker 
därför genom en framtidssimulation jämföra nuvarande skattesystem med det reviderande 
skattesystemet för att identifiera finansiella effekter. Studien visar slutsatser som menar att 
nuvarande skattesystem har bättre planeringsmöjligheter att skjuta upp beskattningen på 
resultatet till följande år, och kan även få konsekvenser på utbudet av skogsprodukter eftersom 
det blir mindre lönsamt att avverka skog.  
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Glossary 
Allocation fund – deposition possibility for private entities in Sweden, allows postponing 
taxation of 30 % of the result before taxes. 
Capital base – the base for calculating the maximum possible depositions for expansion fund 
and interest allocations. 
Cumulative distribution curve – curve that provides possible future scenarios, showing less 
and more likely outcomes. 
Depositions – several possibilities to postpone taxation or distribute the result more even  
Expansion fund – deposition possibility based on a capital base, allow a private entity to bring 
result for a tax rate of 22 %. 
Interest allocation – deposition possibility that is based on a capital base, which allows a 
private entity to move funds between income of business and income of capital. 
NIPF landowner – Nonindustrial Private Forest landowner, who possess forestland as private 
property, and operates the business as a private entity. 
Result before taxes – revenues subtracted with costs, interests and depositions. 
Total profit – The amount of funds that determine the final result after taxes, including untaxed 
assets. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Sweden is a country endowed with large natural resources, where the forest represents one of 
them. The total area of land in Sweden is 40.8 million hectares, where 28.1 million hectares are 
forestland areas, including idle land and mires (Nilsson, 2015, p. 53). Coniferous forests cover 
the main part of the forestland in Sweden, which contains different types of spruces and pines 
(Andersson, 2013). These types of trees have long lifecycles, usually about 70-120 years, before 
there is a final product, such as roundwood, wood pulp or biofuel (Andersson, 2013).   
  
Historically the forest industry has played a major part in the Swedish economy (Kleinschmit et 
al., 2011), where the sawing industry employed a great amount of people in the 19th and 20th 
century by producing saw timber and wood pulp (Bertholdson et al., 2014; www, Skogssverige, 
n.d.). Currently the forest industry employs 175 000 people including subcontractors, and 
Sweden is now the third largest exporter in the world of paper, wood pulp, and sawn wood 
(www, Skogsindustrierna, 2016).  
  
The forestland in Sweden can be divided into three major ownership categories, where the largest 
category is nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) landowners, whom together own 52 % of the 
productive forestland (Nilsson, 2015, p. 92). Incorporated companies own 24 % and others, such 
as the state of Sweden and the Swedish church, own the remaining 24 % (Nilsson, 2015, p. 92). 
In Sweden, there are different taxation regulations depending on whether it is an incorporated 
company or a private entity, and NIPF landowners tend to run their business as a private entity 
(Nilsson, 2015). Currently a debate questions taxation policies for private entities in Sweden. 
 
1.1 Problem background 
The ongoing debate concerning whether current depositions possibilities are too complex for the 
private entities, including several deposition possibilities with different regulations (Aronsson, 
2014; Norrskog, n.d; Lepikko, 2016). This concern has led to a public investigation conducted by 
the Swedish government - Simplified taxation regulation for private entities (SOU 2014:68). The 
investigation has examined how the current legislations can be simplified, as private entities are 
assumed to have incentives to make the declaration as simple as possible to prevent unnecessary 
administrative costs  (SOU 2014:68). In the current legislation, a private entity has the deposition 
possibilities of allocation fund, expansion fund, forest and forest damage account, and authorship 
account (SOU 2014:68). The investigation suggests, removing the current deposition possibilities 
and replacing them with a business fund. However, there are different opinions about the impact 
of this reform. More specifically, it is questioned what financial effects the tax reform will have 
for the private entities (Aronsson, 2014; Norrskog, n.d; Lepikko, 2016). NIPF landowners are the 
only private entities that can use forest account and forest damage account as a deposition (SFS 
1999:1229, ch.21), which are arguments to study the financial effects of the proposed changes in 
the tax structure for NIPF landowners. 
 
NIPF landowners commonly use forest account as a planning tool, having an impact on when to 
harvest and when to reforest (Aronsson, 2014; Norrskog, n.d; Lepikko, 2016). The uncertainty 
about whether the current tax privilege that forest accounts allows shall remain or not may reflect 
in the wood market. These are arguments to see what the effects would be if forest account where 
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to be deregulated from a micro perspective and how the deregulation may affect the overall 
supply of wood products.  
 
Sweden is the third largest exporter of certain wood products in the world (www, 
Skogsindustrierna, 2016), but statistics show that Swedish exports and production of wood 
products has been changing lately, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The figures show the 
development of export and production of forest products in Sweden, such as paper, wood pulp, 
and roundwood. What the charts reveal is that the export value on Swedish wood and the general 
production has been stagnating. There could be several reasons explaining the observed 
stagnation, however several studies show that when market conditions are uncertain, NIPF 
landowners tend to postpone deforestation (Brazee & Newman, 1999; Aronsson, 1990, Amacher 
et al., 2003; Amacher, 1997). 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1 Value of Swedish forest export (Skogsstyrelsen 2014 p.297-320, own processing) 
  
 
  
Figure 2 Production of different tree types in Sweden (Skogsstyrelsen, 2014 p. 205-215, own processing) 
In order to influence NIPF landowner’s management and strategic decisions, governments can 
use various policy instruments (Fortney, et al., 2011; Bertholdsson et al., 2014; Hibbard et al., 
2013). These policy instruments vary in their goals. It could both be financial instruments to 
facilitate the NIPF landowners’ enterprise (Bertholdsson et al., 2014) and instruments addressing 
environmental concerns (www, Skogsstyrelsen a, n.d.). One of the most frequently used policy 
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instruments for forest owners are tax incentive programs (Fortney, et al., 2011; Hibbard et al., 
2013).  
 
Forest account and forest damage accounts are a type of deposition possibilities, which allows 
forest owners to postpone the taxation of the result before taxes (Aronsson, 2014; Lepikko, 2016; 
Bertholdsson et al., 2014). There are long periods in the forest industry, as it takes 70-120 years 
to produce the final product, there can be large revenues from the forest some years while the 
costs are high the next year. Therefore, the forest account will help to spread the forest-based 
revenue over a longer period. A NIPF landowner can set aside 40-60 % of the harvest revenue to 
a forest account (SFS 1999:1229 ch.21 §26). Although, if the forest must be harvested due to 
natural disasters, such as storms or a specific plant disease, then the NIPF landowner can use the 
forest damage account, which allows for postponing taxation on up to 80 % of the revenue from 
the harvest for a longer period of time (SFS 1999:1229 ch.21 §26). This study will examine the 
impact of SOU 2014:68 on NIPF landowners by simulating future prices on wood, keeping into 
account its historical volatility and applying it on a possible future scenario.  
 
From an empirical perspective, the thesis examines what effects governmental policies can have 
on NIPF landowners in Sweden, and will provide tangible results for how the new potential 
governmental policy would affect the NIPF landowners. Further, the thesis also contributes in the 
academic discourse on forest policy analysis and policy theory. Amacher et al., (2003) are 
arguing that much more can be done in literature that has a focus on links between government 
interventions and NIPF landowner’s behavior. Governmental policies force NIPF landowners to 
enter into different agreements and consequences are that the market may be affected in an 
undesirable way (Amacher et al., 2003). This drives interest toward the examination of how the 
potential new governmental policy can affect NIPF landowners. 
1.2 Problem  
Policy interventions are commonly used in order to influence NIPF landowners, where tax 
incentive programs especially have effects on NIPF landowner’s decision-making (Fortney, et 
al., 2011; Hibbard et al., 2013). The problem to examine is the effects a new tax structure may 
have on NIPF landowners in Sweden, to see how different policy interventions will affect NIPF 
landowners. Further, there is also an ongoing discussion whether there is enough connection 
between science and practice, or if the attempts to connect them should be given up (Krott, 
2012). The study is in the sense trying to fill a gap, showing how something that is constructed 
theoretically will work in practice with future simulations.  
 
The stagnation in the production of wood products and export of forest products in Sweden open 
up for a need for a study that investigates influencing factors. Previous studies show that in 
uncertain market situations NIPF landowners tend to postpone the harvest of wood and it has 
been argued that increasing progressivity of tax systems has caused a stagnation of the supply of 
wood.  (Brazee & Newman, 1999; Aronssson, 1990; Amacher et al., 2003; Amacher, 1997). If 
the SOU 2014:68 will increase the progressivity of the tax, the stagnation in the industry may 
continue.  
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1.3 Aim and research question 
This thesis aims to examine governmental policy effects on NIPF landowners in Sweden, by 
analyzing the ongoing investigation that suggests revising the tax structure for private entities in 
Sweden. The aim will be addressed by answering the following research question:   
  
What will be the financial effects be for nonindustrial private forest landowners if forest 
accounts were to be revised according to the proposal provided within the investigation 
SOU 2014:68?   
 
1.4 Delimitations  
This study will look into the possible effects of SOU 2014:68 on Swedish NIPF landowners, and 
the reader is assumed to have basic knowledge about Swedish taxation. The conduction of the 
study will be done through simulated numerical future scenarios on three different NIPF 
landowners. Concerning the NIPF landowners, it is necessary to state some assumptions in order 
to conduct the simulation. These assumptions regard for instance price and production of 
roundwood, cost structure, depositions and result before taxes. It is also assumed in the study that 
the NIPF landowners only sell roundwood as felling rights, as it is the most common way for 
NIPF landowners to trade their forest (Skogsbarometern, 2014). These assumptions are affecting 
the outcome of the study, as assumptions can cause a distorted result. 
 
The NIPF landowners in the study are assumed not to use interest allocations. Interest allocations 
is as a way to transfer funds from income of business to income of capital, which has a fixed tax 
rate of 30 % (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §7, see section 1.5 and 4.2.3 for further information). The 
investigation SOU 2014:68 only suggest minor changes for the regulations concerning interest 
allocations, which motivate the decision not to compare different scenarios where NIPF 
landowners deposit funds to interest allocations. Neither has the forest damage account been 
investigated, as it assumed that the simulation will not have any natural disasters. Further on, 
there will be no statements concerning if it is optimal for the NIPF landowner to harvest during 
the assumed years in the simulation, nor any statement on optimal quantity as the thesis will only 
look at the financial consequences for deregulating forest account. Since the study only 
investigates three different NIPF landowners, it is not possible to make general conclusions for 
the industry. However, the study tries to reflect over the characteristics of the industry in a 
sufficient way. A study involving further NIPF landowners would increase the robustness of the 
results.  
 
1.5 An overview of current tax legislation for private entities  
The actual tax burden may depend on several things, for instance, the type of income, its 
magnitude, and underlying legal entity, i.e., a private person or an incorporated company. The 
income can be of three types – income of labor, income of business and income of capital (SFS 
1999:1229). The taxation of the types of income are all different, income of labor has a 
progressive tax rate (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §3), income of capital has a fixed tax rate of 30 % 
(SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §7), and the taxation of income of business depends on the company 
form. An incorporated company faces a 22 % tax rate (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §10) and the same 
progressive tax rate as for income of labor is affecting the private entity (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, 
§3).  
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The thesis will look into the affects for private entities, caused by SOU 2014:68, and therefore 
the progressive tax rate will play a major role in the study. The progressive tax rate has three 
different levels, where the percentage increases in correlation with the income/result before 
taxes. Table 1 shows the different levels of progressive tax rate.  
 
Table 1 Progressive tax rate limits (SFS 1999:1229 ch.65, §3; www, Skatteverket n.d a; own processing) 
Tax thresholds for income Description  Tax rate  
< 430 200 SEK  Taxed with municipally tax 
rate  
32 % (average tax rate may 
differ between the different 
municipalities in Sweden )  
430 200 – 625 800 SEK  A governmental tax rate of 20 
% is added on the 
municipally tax rate   
52 %  
> 625 800 SEK   A governmental tax rate of 25 
% is added on the 
municipally tax rate   
57 %  
   
Within the current tax regulation, there are several deposition possibilities for private entities, 
such as allocation funds, expansion funds, interest allocations, forest and forest damage accounts, 
and authorship account. These are all different possibilities for a company to distribute result 
before taxes to following years. Some of the depositions are based on a capital base, which 
determines the maximum allowed deposition. The capital base varies depending on which 
deposition that is used. Table 2 show a simplified summary of the deposition possibilities, 
section 4.2 presents a more profound description. The thesis will not investigate the authorship 
account.  
 
 Table 2 Summary of current deposition possibilities (SFS 1999:1229, own processing) 
Deposition possibility  Description  
Allocation fund  30 % of the result can be deposit into an 
allocation fund. The fund allows funds to be 
untaxed up to six years. The sixth year the 
fund must be brought up for taxation. (SFS 
1999:1229 ch.30) 
Expansion fund  It is an opportunity for a private entity to tax a 
part of their result with 22 %. The maximum 
deposition is 128.21 % of the company’s 
capital base, which has to be accounted each 
year. The deposition has no time limit, but the 
total summation of depositions can never 
exceed 128.21 % of capital base. When funds 
are withdrawal, the tax of 22% is subtracted 
to actual tax rate (SFS 1999:1229 ch.34) 
Interest allocation  
positive  
The private entity can move capital from 
income of business to income of capital, and 
then be taxed with a 30 % tax rate. The 
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deposition depends on the capital base, which 
has to be positive. There is no time limit. 
(SFS 1999:1229 ch.33) 
Interest allocation  
negative  
If the capital base is negative, the company 
has to move capital from income of capital to 
income of business, and tax it with a 
progressive tax rate. (SFS 1999:1229 ch.33) 
   
When harvesting forest, NIPF landowners have the opportunity to deposit a part of the revenue 
into a forest account. If natural disasters, such as a storm or a fire, force the NIPF landowners to 
harvest their forest, the forest damage account provides greater deposition possibilities than the 
forest account. The forest account has a time limit of ten years, and the forest damage account of 
twenty years (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21, §36). The deposition is depending on what type of forest 
product the NIPF landowner has sold (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21 §25-26), shown in table 3.  
  
Table 3 Forest and forest damage account (SFS 1999:1229 ch.21, own processing) 
Product  Forest account  Forest damage account  
Felling rights  60 % of the earnings   80 % of the earnings  
Shipping timber  40 % of the earnings  50 % of the earnings  
Extraction of forest 
products  
40 % of the earnings  50 % of the earnings  
   
1.6 SOU 2014:68  
All of the mentioned deposition possibilities have been considered by the governmental 
investigation Simplified taxation regulation for private entities (SOU 2014:68), where the 
investigation looks into the current tax structure in order to simplify it. SOU 2014:68 suggests 
that an alternative would be to replace current deposition possibilities with one deposition, called 
the business fund (SOU 2014:68, p. 122). This business fund would allow a deposition of 40 % 
of the company’s result before taxes, as long as it does not exceed the company’s capital base. It 
will not have a time limit, similar to the expansion fund.  
 
1.7 Possible tax effects with business fund  
In order to illustrate the differences between the current legislation and the proposed changes in 
SOU 2014:68, table 4 show the effects for a NIPF landowner. In this example, the NIPF 
landowner only use a forest accounts for depositions in the current legislation, in order to 
simplify it. Assume that the NIPF landowner has a revenue of 100 from disforestation, and 100 
from another income source, for instance agriculture. The NIPF landowner has fixed cost of 40 
and a variable of 20 % of the total revenue, in this case (100+100)*0.2=40. The costs are equally 
divided between the forest based income and the other income source. 
 
As Table 4 show, there are greater deposition possibilities with current legislation since the 
deposition for forest account is based on the revenue from harvesting (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21, 
§25-26), and the business fund is based on result before taxes (SOU 2014:68). The table 
illustrates that the NIPF landowner will bring up a higher result before taxes and will 
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consequently be taxed more. However, no tax thresholds is considered in the example and opens 
up interest to further examination of SOU 2014:68. 
 
Table 4 Example current legislation vs SOU 2014:68 (own processing) 
   
 
  
7 
 
 
 
2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter includes an overview of the theoretical framework and literature that the study will 
use. It will give an overview of the theories in order to understand the analysis provided.  
2.1 Policy theory 
Hoogerwerf (1990) define policy theory as a theory that helps to analyze a certain content within 
an existing or non-existing policy. It involves the designers, the decision makers, and the process 
of implementing the policy (Hoogerwerf, 1990). Policy theory explain the content and the idea 
that are explicitly or implicitly found in a written or oral policy (Hoogerwerf, 1990).  2.1.1 Policy theory in the forest sector  
The literature on forest policy and forest economics has historically been focusing on the most 
important factors that determine the NIPF landowner’s behavior for what may concern the 
decision to harvest and reforest, and the relative timing (Amacher et al., 2003; Binkley, 1981; 
Hyberg & Holthausen 1989; Amacher, 1997). An ongoing concern is about how the government 
should interfere with the forest market (Amacher, 1997, Boyd & Hyde, 1989, Krott, 2012). In the 
past three decades, taxation in the forestry sector has been one of the most studied areas within 
the fields of forest policy and forest economics. Forest taxation has focused on how to set tax 
rates to forest growth and harvest policies, to reach long-term targets, in terms of profits and 
environmentally sustainable production (Amacher, 1997). Amacher (1997) contributes to this 
discourse, highlighting that taxation in the forest sector can be a quite complex issue, and that 
governments face three types of constraints when designing tax policies for the forest industry.    
Amacher (1997) studies “how the forest taxation literature has progressed towards 
incorporating them into formal models of policy design” (p.105), which would help to motivate 
ideas for future research. A general finding is that most governments face three types of 
constraints that prevent optimal implementation of a first best taxation system. First, 
governments are constrained in the sense that governments often have targets on how much 
revenues a certain industry should bring in through taxes, which limits possibilities to change tax 
structures if targets should be met (Amacher, 1997, p.105). Second, governments can be 
constrained in the sense that forest taxation are distorted to begin with, for example, the taxation 
does not relate to all forest activities in practice. There are few policies targeting standing forests, 
and virtually no tax that directly targets non-timber benefits, which implies that any tax system is 
potentially distortional to forest management decisions (Amacher, 1997, p.106). 
 
The third constraint on government tax policies arises as governments rarely implement or 
change tax-policies in isolation, rather there are pre-existing distortions that make the reform in 
existing policies or the choice between new ones difficult. In this case, introducing new taxes 
along with their additional distortions may result in a less efficient tax structure than the one 
currently in place. “In fact neutrality of a specific tax may no longer be desirable. The second 
feature of the forest policy environment is the many governments involved in policy design. 
Often, different levels of governments control different forest taxes” (Amacher, 1997 p.106). 
However, governments’ main concern is about their own targets, which may result in 
coordination failure and the impossibility to ensure forest taxes in practice. Instead, different 
sections in the government compete for revenue collections from tax and may behave in a way to 
maximize profit (Amacher, 1997).  
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This strategic behavior from the different sections in the government may result in inefficient 
levels of public goods provided from forests and excess burdens that are higher than when 
governments coordinate perfectly. The constraints and competition of tax revenue has remained 
unstudied in forestry policy (Amacher 1997). Also most of the previous work does not seek to 
recommend the best normative tax system for meeting a government's revenue and facing the 
different constraints (Amacher, 1997). In line with Amacher, (1997), Boyd and Hyde (1989) 
shows an empirical analysis on how public regulation can distort optimal market conditions.  
 2.1.2 Policy effects on supply and demand 
Boyd and Hyde (1989) explain how public regulations have an impact on social welfare, where 
forestry sector intervention is used to show the effects of governmental interference and how it 
can distort optimal market conditions (Boyd & Hyde, 1989). In their study, they show that 
governmental regulations interfere with market conditions. Regulations in the market will be well 
suited when it aims to redistribute income to the less well off in society or increase price stability 
for a good (Boyd & Hyde, 1989). Forest sector intervention brings up the point on regulating 
supply and demand.  
  
Neoclassical economic theory means that supply and demand are self-regulated. Given that, 
producers and buyers make decisions in order to maximize their profit or utility, have access to 
the same information and that the buyers have rational preferences between outcomes that can be 
associated with values. (Veblen, 1963; Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2012). For normal goods, the 
theory posits that if the firm lowers the price it will reach a higher demand, and if the firms 
increase the price it will reach a lower demand (Arrow, 1967; Nicholson, 2012). Firms will 
operate in a manner so that they produce an optimal amount of output, given output and input 
prices. By definition, this optimal amount is such that the corresponding marginal revenue (MR) 
equals the marginal cost of production (MC). Assuming perfect competition, if price or costs 
change firms will no longer produce at optimum, and will change their output or price in order to 
make MR=MC (Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2012). Despite this, governments tend to regulate 
markets, for example if a government want to prioritize the production of a certain good, it can 
pay subsidies to R&D or give tax reliefs on the good with the intention to decrease its price 
(Martin & Scott, 2000). Also, if governments want to decrease the use of certain good that, for 
instance, can be of harm to the population, governments can add extra taxes with the intention to 
make the good more expensive (Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2012).  
  
Boyd and Hyde (1989) apply the neoclassical economic theory on the forest sector, stating that 
governments should not distort markets as it hinders optimal market incentives. They highlight 
the lack of empirical studies and call for further studies focusing on the identification of better 
policies for the forest industry (Boyd & Hyde, 1989).  Krott (2012) contributes to the discourse 
on policy interventions, arguing that there is a need for further integration between science and 
reality when designing policy tools. Krott (2012) argues that scientific knowledge will most 
likely be distant from reality. However, through a scientific process, knowledge gets increasingly 
closer to reality, but there is a great need for better information as a source for solving problems 
and gaining power (Krott, 2012). Better information concerning forest politics would provide a 
greater understanding of the consequences of specific policy issues and regulations (Krott, 2012). 
The information would be useful in the process of designing new policies and regulations. It is 
suggested that the separation between science and practice has to be given up, and instead either 
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integrate scientific arguments in a political discourse, or identify active boundaries between the 
two realms that are mainly strategically designed (Krott, 2012). Suggested is an idea of merging 
science and reality when designing new policies, or reforming existing market interventions or 
policy instruments for markets (Krott, 2012).  
  
2.2 Microeconomic theory  
To analyze firms or peoples choices, microeconomic theory can be used to provide scenarios 
about how the firm or individual will spend the resources available in order to maximize utility 
(Nicholson, 2002). Utility is highly subjective and depends on individual preferences. Measuring 
actual utility level is usually hard, in order to make statements based on utility considerations, it 
is common to use assumptions about the utility, and seek for either quantifiable variables, which 
will increase or decrease utility. One variable that usually increases the utility is profit 
(Nicholson, 2002). 
  2.2.1 Microeconomic theory in the forest sector 
Earlier studies on NIPF landowners involves assumptions on the NIPF behavior about the timing 
of harvest and reforestation (see Rodríguez-Vicentea & Pérez, 2010; Alig et al., 1990; Fortney et 
al., 2011). NIPF landowners are in these studies assumed to act according to profit maximizing 
behavior (Aronsson, 1990; Fortney et al., 2011).  However, in addition to profit, recent studies 
show that other factors affect NIPF landowners’ decisions on how to manage the forest. These 
include the opportunity of providing non-timber goods and services, leaving the forest as 
bequests to the next generation, or simply wait until the price level is adequate (Conway et al., 
2003; Bolkesjø & Baardsen, 2001). In addition, a great amount of NIPF landowners has an 
alternative occupation as main income source, which can make them spend less time on forest 
management (Rodríguez-Vicentea & Pérez, 2010). Absenteeism and forest intentions work as 
destabilizers for the economic sustainability in forest markets. Making forest management and 
NIPF landowners’ decisions hard to predict and leaving further room for studies (Rodríguez-
Vicentea & Pérez, 2010; Bolkesjø & Baardsen, 2001). 
  2.2.2 The Aronsson’s model 
Aronsson, (1990) provides a model about how NIPF landowners behave when the tax structure is 
progressive and how the progressivity of the tax will affect the overall supply of forest products 
in Sweden. In the model NIPF landowners gain utility from consumption, which means that all 
funds that is left after subtracting costs, deposition, savings and taxes from the revenue are 
assumed consumption. This has a positive effect on the utility of the NIPF landowners 
(Aronsson, 1990). Future harvest depends on the volume harvested today and on the initial forest 
value (Aronsson, 1990). The model posits potential outcomes for the supply of roundwood in 
Sweden, and how the progressive tax rate affect NIPF landowner’s decisions to disforest. 
Aronsson (1990) find that if progressivity increases marginally it will affect the decision not to 
disforest substantially. 
  2.2.3 Conway et al.’s model 
A study similar to the one in Aronsson (1990) can be found in Conway et al., (2003). Conway et 
al., (2003) imply that there is a lack of studies on how non-timber services affect the utility of 
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NIPF landowners. That not all NIPF landowners use the forest for maximizing profit from 
disforestation. Instead, NIPF landowners can gain equal amount of utility by leaving forest as 
bequest or use it for non-timber services.  
  
By including other variables such as hunting or leaving forestland as bequest, Conway et al., 
(2003) is examining the utility of the forest owner. With the variables taken into consideration, 
the study is estimating how to maximize the NIPF landowner’s utility and explain the behavior of 
NIPF landowners. The conclusions from the study is that the NIPF landowners are in fact not 
only possessing forest for harvesting it. NIPF landowners also gain utility from letting forest be a 
bequest for next generation or letting the forest grow in order to increase the property value 
(Conway et al., 2003).  
  
Until now, we have presented studies that are supposed to illustrate that multiple variables effect 
NIPF landowners’ management of their forest. To address our aim, we want to compare different 
scenarios. One scenario that will show how the future profits for the NIPF landowners will be, if 
they still have the possibility to deposit funds to forest account, expansion fund and allocation 
fund. The other scenario is when the NIPF landowner only has the business fund as deposition 
possibility. In order to compare the two different scenarios a new model has been set-up.   
  
2.3 The model set-up 
Our model results from the combination of some elements presented in both Aronsson (1990) 
and Conway et al., (2003). It must be stressed that in our model, consistently with the focus in 
our study, we do not seek equilibriums or try to optimize the utility of the considered NIPF 
landowners. The study is comparing two different scenarios and investigates 1) the different 
results from possible future scenarios from the studied NIPF landowner’s accountings in 
qualitative discussion, 2) what impact, the given results from the studied NIPF landowners’ 
accountings, might have for the supply of roundwood.  The study uses the model to quantify the 
profit accruing to the NIPF landowners. 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = �𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, + 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖, + 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, + 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, − 𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Equation 1 Forest account model, (own processing) 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = (𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝑄) − (𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶) + (𝑀𝑀− 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶2) −𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖, − 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, − 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 
Equation 2 Forest account model (own processing) 
The Ci is the revenue subtracted with costs and depositions. Dfi ,Dai,Dei represent the different 
depositions possibilities. Assume NIPF landowner gain profit from 1) The results after 
depositions (Ci) 2) The funds available in the different depositions accounts (Dfi+Dai+ Dei). What 
will decrease the profit is T, which is the tax paid on the result after the different depositions are 
made. The NIPF landowners will maximize the deposition possibilities until he/she reaches a 
result that is satisfied (see method chapter 3.3 to see result assumptions). The NIPF landowner 
will make the depositions in the following order.  
  
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = (𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝑄) − (𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶) + (𝑀𝑀− 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶2) > 0  
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦1(𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝑄) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = (𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝑄) − (𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶) + (𝑀𝑀− 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶2) − 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 > 0 
11 
 
 
 
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 =  𝑦𝑦2(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖) 
𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = (𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝑄) − (𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶) + (𝑀𝑀− 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶2) − 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 − 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 > 0 
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 =  𝑦𝑦3(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) 
Equation 3 Deposition order for forest account (own processing) 
The tax on income is, according to SFS 1999:1229, based on the result after depositions and is 
calculated using the following equation: 
  
𝑇𝑇 = �𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑡𝑡23
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝑡𝑡3 
Equation 4 Tax model (SFS 1999:1229 ch21 §21) (own processing) 
We take into consideration the following different thresholds in order to levy the proper tax rates 
 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  ≤ 430200 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡1 = 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑟1  
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 430200 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 ≤ 625800 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡2 = ((𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 430200) ∗ 𝑟𝑟2) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ≥ 625800 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡3 = 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 − 625800 ∗ 𝑟𝑟3 
Equation 5 Tax thresholds (own processing) 
With some adjustments, it is possible to use the same model when calculating the other scenario, 
which is the case where the only possible deposition is the business fund. Dbi is the new 
deposition possibility and T is the tax paid based on Ci. The study still assumes that NIPF 
landowner gain profit from the funds available from the deposition.  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = �(𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑇𝑇∞
𝑖𝑖=1
 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = (𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝑄) − (𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶) + (𝑀𝑀 − 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶2) − 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = (𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝑄) − (𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶) + (𝑀𝑀− 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶2) > 0 
𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦4((𝑇𝑇 ∗ 𝑄𝑄) − (𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶) + (𝑀𝑀− 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶2)) 
Equation 6 Business fund model (own processing)  
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∶ 
𝑖𝑖 =  𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎  
𝑇𝑇 =  𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒  
𝑄𝑄 =  𝑄𝑄𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶1 =  𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 =  𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 
𝑀𝑀 =  𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶2 =  𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒 
𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 =  𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  
𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎 =  𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 
𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒 =  𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 
𝑦𝑦1 =  𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  
𝑟𝑟 =  𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  
𝑦𝑦2 =  𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 
𝑦𝑦3 =  𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖max𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎  
𝑦𝑦4 = 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖max𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 
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𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 
 
𝑡𝑡1 = 𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 
𝑡𝑡2 = 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 1 
𝑡𝑡3 = 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 2 
𝑟𝑟1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 @ 32% 
𝑟𝑟2 = 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 @ 52% 
𝑟𝑟3 = 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 @ 57% 
 
2.4 Net Present Value  
For the results to be more precise, all the future profits have been discounted using Net Present 
Value (NPV). The difference between the discounted cash flow generated by an investment 
project and investment cost initially paid for undertaking it gives the NPV (Brealey & Myers, 
2003). When budgeting an investments or projects profitability the NPV can help evaluate a 
project by comparing other investment opportunities (Brealey & Myers, 2003). In this study, the 
NPV is total profit before taxation for each company. The formula used for the calculation of the 
NPV is the following: 
𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉 = −𝐼𝐼 + � 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹(1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡∞
𝑡𝑡=1
 
  
Equation 7 Net present value, own processing (Brealey & Myers, 2003) 
Where:  
I – the cost for the initial investment 
CF – Stream of future cash flow generated by the investment 
t – Time 
r – Discount rate 
2.5 Decisions connected with risk   
When analyzing a decision to be made ex ante, there are reasons to formulate probabilities about 
the risk involved with the decisions and investigate the different outcomes that might actually 
materialize (Hardaker et al., 2015; Brealey et al., 2011). What is determining the risk is the result 
of many factors, and is highly dependent on the context. When considering the context, think for 
instance of comparing the purchase of a governmental bond with investing in the stock of a 
pharmaceutical company. A governmental bond is often a safe investment connected with low 
risk, but also low profits (Brealey et al., 2011). A share in a start-up pharmaceutical company is 
instead often associated with high risk, but can pay out high dividends if the company is 
successful (Brealey et al., 2011).  
  
What the example is supposed to show is the connection of different investments with different 
kinds of risk. If an investor were to buy stocks or bonds with his/hers capital he/she is most likely 
to investigate worst and best case scenarios of the investment to do so one can use what is called 
Monte Carlo simulation.  
  
13 
 
 
 
2.6 Monte Carlo simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is a tool used in risk analysis, where models are built to calculate 
potential outcomes based on uncertain variables (Hardaker et al., 2015). The simulation can 
provide an estimation of the future and provide a potential outcome based on probability 
distributions, thus, estimate what results are more or less likely to occur (Hardaker et al., 2015).  
MCS use multiple random numbers, with series of computational algorithms, to compute 
possible outcomes based on repeated random sampling (Hardaker et al., 2015). 
  
Iterations are different outcomes, each iteration is a sampling that represents an estimation of 
stochastic elements that could occur (Hardaker et al. 2015). With enough iterations, it is possible 
to create a more stable probability distribution. The simulation can be set up in order to make it 
possible to see if an investment is profitable or not, or examine different settings if things were to 
change in the market (Hardaker et al. 2015).  
  
  
 
Figure 3 Probability density function (PDF) (Hardaker et al., 2015) 
Figure 3 show a probability density function (PDF). A probability density function is usually 
shaped like a bell, with a central peak indicating most likely value of the uncertain quantity, and 
with the low probabilities in the “tales” on each side of the peak (Hardaker et al. 2015). In the 
figure it is shown a PDF with the uncertain quantity of X, denoted by f(X), with a minimum value 
of a, and a maximum value of b, and mode at m (Hardaker et al. 2015). Every PDF has the 
property that the area under the whole curve is equal to one. The shaded area (A) shows the 
probability of values between a and X (Hardaker et al. 2015). There are some problems 
associated with the PDF in decision analysis, in particular, it can be challenging to make sure that 
the area below the curve is actually equal to one, which is a rule that probability requires. 
Therefore, it is common to use a cumulative distribution function (CDF) (Hardaker et al. 2015).  
  
The CDF is the function that gives probabilities of a certain scenario (Hardaker et al. 2015). By 
repeatedly selecting different values between zero and one, the sample is generating different 
scenarios, where scenarios in the middle has high probability (Hardaker et al., 2015). What is 
explained is for a single variate sample for x are more likely to be drawn in areas with higher 
probabilities of occurrence. With enough iterations, in this case different x, MCS will recreate 
probability distributions (Hardaker et al., 2015). In the function a single variable is used, 
however it is almost the same as if several of uncertain iterations are simulated, the difference is 
that in the multi-iterations case, it is necessary to account for the co-dependency (Hardaker et al., 
2015). Figure 4 shows the inverse CDF, where the most likely results are shown where the graph 
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is the steepest while the most unlikely where it fades out, similar to the tales in the PDF 
(Hardaker et al. 2015). 
  
 
Figure 4 Inverse cumulative distribution function (Hardaker et al., 2015) 2.6.1 @RISK 
@Risk is a software used as an add-in in Microsoft excel which computes MCS by adding 
relevant data into it. By fitting distribution to the observed time series and generating a number 
of extra observations the program presents future possible outcomes (www, @Risk, 2016). The 
risk analysis performed by the program is consistent with the assumptions and provides the 
probability of how likely they will occur. @Risk is a valuable tool for decisions under 
uncertainty (www, @Risk, 2016).  
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3 METHOD 
This chapter will provide an overview of the conduction of the thesis, the used methods and the 
procedure followed for the simulations used in order to achieve the results. 
 
3.1 Mixed method 
The conduction of the thesis bases on a merge between quantitative and qualitative research 
methods. This type of research approach has arguments either for and against, debating whether 
it is suitable or not to combine the two approaches (Bryman & Bell, 2011, Bryman, 2014). For 
instance, research argues that the two methods are paradigms of each other, as they are built on 
different epistemological theses (Bryman & Bell, 2011). However, recent studies in social 
research methods shows that the mixed methods are becoming a more common approach and 
that the two epistemological theses can benefit from mixing them (Bryman, 2014). 
 
The quantitative research approach has a penchant for natural science, where concrete numbers 
and figures are the basis of the analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2011). A quantitative research method 
is built on the ability to measure, it is described as a reliable tool or a yardstick to observe and 
measure differences (Bryman & Bell, 2011). It also provides a "more precise estimate of the 
degree of relationship between concepts", giving the tools to examine certain factors more 
thoroughly (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 154). A quantitative research approach attaches a great 
importance on the ability to prove a certain point, for instance by the possibility to measure it. It 
also has a deductive approach towards theory, where the theory is commonly set before the 
results are actually realized (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
 
A qualitative research approach differs from the quantitative method since the qualitative 
approach puts a higher value on words instead of numbers (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The approach 
has an inductive view on the relation between theory and research, where the theory often is 
generated from the collected data (Bryman & Bell, 2011). It has an interpretive epistemological 
position, where it focus on examining the interpretation of the social environment, and further on 
has an ontological position where it states that social properties are outcomes of the interactions 
between individuals (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 386). 
 
When using a combination of these two approaches the qualitative method can be seen as a 
support to the quantitative approach. In fact, through its less structured approach it can help bring 
up ideas to examine further on in the research process (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The qualitative 
approach can also be of assistance in the study. With its knowledge about different social 
contexts, the analysis can in fact be broader than the one based only on the analysis of numerical 
data (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The mixture between the methods are called mixed method, and is 
often used when research questions are designed in a way so that they partially will give a 
concrete result, but also how the result will function in a less concrete contexts (Bryman, 2014).  
 
In this thesis, numerical data has a vital part of the empirics, which motivates a quantitative 
approach. On the other hand, the theory has emerged through research process, which implies a 
qualitative approach. In addition, the qualitative approach allows analyzing the results in a 
broader context (Bryman, 2014). This allows drawing possible conclusion instead of definite 
conclusions, although definite conclusion has more robustness, possible conclusion opens up for 
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further studies which suits well when contributing to policy theory, which often lacks empirical 
studies (Amacher et al., 2003; Krott, 2012; Hoogerwerf, 1990).    
3.2 Selection of empirical data 
In order to conduct the study, three different NIPF landowner’s accountings were collected as 
empirical data. These different companies are of different sizes and characteristics, but all with 
the common denominator that they own forest. The companies will remain anonymous through 
the thesis and will be referred to as C1, C2 and C3. 
 
As soon as the focus of the study was identified, LRF Konsult was contacted in order to collect 
empirical data. LRF Konsult was informed with what the study was supposed to investigate, and 
that it was desirable to have different companies that reflected the market adequate. Due to 
secrecy, LRF Konsult did the selection of companies on their own, as the companies wanted to 
remain anonymous. The decision to ask LRF Konsult for help to collect data is because it is the 
largest advisory company within Sweden, with a special focus in the agriculture and forest sector 
(www, LRF Konsult a, n.d.; www, LRF Konsult b, n.d.). This study has not been conducted as a 
report for LRF Konsult. 
 
The NIPF landowners were chosen in order to represent the industry fair. One has high turnover 
with a small amount, less than 10 %, based on forestry, another has high turnover with significant 
amount, greater than 50 %, comes from deforestation, and the final one that has low turnover 
solely originated from the forest. The differences between the companies will represent the actual 
market, where NIPF landowners tend to run their business differently (Bertholdsson et al., 2014). 3.2.1 General assumptions for NIPF landowners 
The received data for the simulation were at some points inadequate, due to the lack of 
information concerning product, price, and volume. Therefore, some assumptions have been 
made in order to make the simulation possible. The provided data included accountings for each 
company where it was possible to deduce the most important financial information, most 
importantly to see in what extent the company was influenced by their forest. Although, it was 
not possible to interpret from what type of forest product the forest revenue was linked. 
Therefore one general assumption is that all the forest-based revenue is linked to the product 
roundwood, sold as felling rights, as felling rights is the most common way for NIPF landowners 
to trade their forest (Skogsbarometern, 2014). This assumption is necessary in order to use the 
right price and quantity in the simulations. 3.2.2 Price and production information 
To make the analysis possible, information about price and production development of forest 
products were collected, mainly from Skogsstyrelsen, for the years 1995-2015. Since the 
received data from LRF Konsult did not contain any information about prices and volumes, these 
statistics have been used in order to create equal conditions where the companies are all facing 
the same price and production development in the simulations. The reason for using the timeline 
of 1995-2015 was to have a broad span, both including natural disasters and a financial crisis, but 
also to have a long period with a stable market (www, Skogsstyrelsen, d, n.d.; Pendery, 2009). 
 
The gathered data is collected from the most recent statistical book from Skogsstyrelsen.  
Skogsstyrelsen is an authority which: "are responsible for the Swedish forest policy brought out 
and put into practice by those who own and manage the forest" (www, Skogsstyrelsen, n.d c). 
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Being a governmental institution engaged in gathering data for the Swedish forest industry, the 
data provided can be trusted and used. 
3.3 Fabrication of the simulations with data  
Based on the received data and assumptions possible future scenarios for the NIPF landowners 
have been simulated using Monte Carlo simulation in the add-in program @Risk for Microsoft 
Excel. 3.3.1 Price and production 
Through the collected price information the changes in price for roundwood was calculated for 
each year between 1995 and 2015. Further, the standard deviation was calculated, using 
following formula: 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 = 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑒𝑒𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 − 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚)2 
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 = 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉 𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒  𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 = 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒  
𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜎𝜎 = �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝐺𝐺𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 
Equation 8 Standard deviation (Brealey et al., 2014, p.167) 
The standard deviation (s.d.) represent the span where the price and volume can fluctuate, using 
a triangular distribution in the software @Risk. The triangular distributions allows setting the 
most likely outcome (mean), maximum outcome and minimum outcome. Using MCS, the most 
and least possible outcomes can be obtained (Hardaker et al., 2015). Thus, a mean outcome can 
be derived from the simulations. It is from the mean that the study has obtained the future results. 
From the mean result for each of the companies, the possible deposition and tax has been 
calculated. Showing how the investigation SOU 2014:68 will affect the NIPF landowners. All 
companies have been examined over a twelve-year time-period. However, the years vary as the 
collected accountings where not consistent in the years. With one scenario that accounts for 
current depositions and one with the new deposition possibility. 
 
The accountings only contained information on the revenue from the disforestation and did not 
include the price that was paid to the NIPF landowner, nor what type of wood it was. A general 
assumption will be that the forest based revenue is felling rights sold to the current market price. 
To obtain the volume, the revenue from the received accountings was divided with the current 
market price from data from Skogsstyrelsen (2014). The same method was also used for the price 
simulations, observing how the total production volume fluctuates during the years 1995-2015, 
calculating change, variance, and standard deviation. The NIPF landowners are assumed to 
operate in a similar way as before, thus they are not allowed any flexibility, which may make the 
result distorted. 3.3.2 Cost assumptions 
To simulate the results, certain assumptions are made about the cost structure for the NIPF 
landowners. All the costs and financial posts are divided into variable and fixed costs, where the 
fixed cost remained static and was discounted with risk free rate. The fixed costs have been 
determined by summation of the following posts: salaries, depreciations and interests. The 
remaining costs were treated as variable. This was conducted as if even when revenue is 0 SEK, 
the fixed costs would remain, where the other costs are more directly related to the turnover. The 
variable costs depends on the revenue, which implies the higher the revenue, the greater the 
costs. It must be stressed that the study does not allow any flexibility for the NIPF landowners, 
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which can make the results distorted. If flexibility would be allowed in the cost structure, it is 
most likely that the results would differ. 3.3.3 Result assumption 
The result for a private entity is taxed as the NIPF landowner’s annual salary. An assumption was 
made that those who have their company as the main occupation wants a salary to live off. In the 
statistics of salaries, a farmer with forest and farmland earns an average of 276 000 SEK annually 
(www, SCB, 2016). Due to this, the part of the results that exceeds 276 000 SEK will be 
available for deposition in to forest accounts or other depositions possibilities. First, a maximum 
deposition to forest account will be made, and thereafter, if the result still exceeds 276 000 SEK, 
other depositions possibilities will be used. Also, if the result is below 276 000 SEK the owner is 
assumed to withdraw funds in order to bring the result up to 276 000 SEK. For the company who 
does not have their business as their major occupation, the desired result is set equal to 0 SEK in 
the simulation. This is due to the assumption that they have another income source outside the 
company to live off. Depositions and withdrawals are then done under the same conditions as for 
the companies with a desired result of 276 000 SEK.  
3.4 Monte Carlo Simulation and @RISK 
The received data were collected in Microsoft Office Excel, where each NIPF landowner 
accountings were compiled in order to get an insight in the business. To simulate the effect of 
forest taxation, revenues and cost were separated into two main groups – forest based income 
source and other income source. 3.4.1  Costs 
The factor that determines the variable costs has been calculated, first by adding all the costs and 
financial posts together which is referred to as total costs. Second, the fixed costs have been 
subtracted with the total costs so that what remains are the variable costs. Third, the revenue 
from the financial statements has been considered in order for a factor to be derived. 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶 − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 → 𝑅𝑅
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶
=∝ 
Equation 9 Cost function 
Where: 
TC= total cost 
FC=fixed cost 
VC= variable costs 
R= total revenue  
∝= variable cost factor  
 
A new variable cost-factor for each financial statement has been determinate in order to be used 
for the simulations.  
 3.4.2  Revenue and price 
If prices should fluctuate without being dependent on the revenue the result would be hard to 
analyze. Following illustration represents a result with cost independency where the average 
price fluctuations has been accounted as well as the price. As the graph shows in figure 5, for the 
company there is a great uncertainty in the future. With a probability of a negative NPV of 19.9 
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% and a positive of 80.1 %, with any number between - 5 817 799 SEK and 28 443 107 SEK. 
What it is supposed to illustrate is that due to the high fluctuating and that certain assumptions is 
needed to make the simulations about future scenarios more realistic. Therefore, costs will 
depend on revenue at a fixed rate.   
 
Figure 5 Cumulative distribution curve (@RISK) 
3.5 Discounting 
The revenue received through the simulations has considered the inflation. The used inflation is 2 
%, which is the inflation goal by the Central Bank of Sweden (www, Riksbanken, 2016). This is 
done in order to present a more precise result, where future price changes are taken into account. 
The risk free rate is the same rate used for i) the calculation of the interests accruing on the forest 
account and ii) the calculation of  the net present values. The rate 0.95 % for forest account is an 
average rate from different banks in Sweden, which have forest account as a product. The banks 
considered were Danske Bank, Handelsbanken, Landshypotek and Swedbank. (www, 
Handelsbanken n.d.; www, Swedbank n.d.; www, Landshypotek n.d.; www, Danske Bank, n.d.).  
 (0,0075 + 0,009 + 0,0105 + 0,01)/4 = 0,0095 
Equation 10 Calculation of discount rate  
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4 EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
The following chapter will provide information about the current tax regulation for private 
entities, the proposed changes in the regulation and some background information about the 
investigated entities.  
4.1 Income taxation in Sweden  
In Sweden, there are different tax regulations depending on whether you run a private entity, 
incorporated company, or a part of a trading company. There are also different categories of 
income  - income of labor, income of business and income of capital. These different types of 
income have different tax rates. Income of labor is taxed by a progressive tax rate that depends 
on how high the income is (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §3). Income of business has different tax rates 
depending on the company form, whether it is an incorporated company or a private entity. 
Incorporated companies have a tax rate of 22 % (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §10) and a private entity 
has a progressive tax rate (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §3). Income of capital is taxed with 30 % (SFS 
1999:1229, ch.65, §7).  
 
The progressive taxation of income of labor is depending on how high an individual’s income is 
for one year. This implies that the more you earn, the higher the tax rate will be. To enforce this, 
there are several levels of tax rates, where the individual first pay taxes to the municipality (SFS 
1999:1229, ch.65 §3, www, Skatteverket, 2016, a). The municipal tax rate can differ with some 
percentage points depending on the geographic locations in Sweden, due to different political 
leaders in the municipality, but is approximately 32 % (www, Skatteverket, 2016, a). When an 
individual’s total income exceeds 430 200 SEK there will be a governmental tax of 20 % added 
on top of the municipal tax, and when exceeding 625 800 SEK a tax rate of 25 % will be added 
(SFS 1999:1229, ch.65 §5, www, Skatteverket, 2016, b). 
 
For example, if a person earn 1 000 000 SEK per year, the income will be split in three different 
tax rates. 430 200 SEK will be taxed with the municipal tax rate, approximately 32 %. The 
income above 430 200 SEK and below 625 800 SEK (195 600 SEK) will be taxed with 32 %, 
with additionally 20 % (52 %), and the final part above 625 800 SEK will be taxed with 32 %, 
added with 25 % (57 %) (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65 §5, www, Skatteverket, 2016, b).   
 
Table 5 Tax example (own processing) 
 
  
             1 000 000,00 kr   
 Amount  Tax 
   
32% 430200 137664 
52% 195600 101296 
57%                375 000,00 kr  213750 
Total tax 1000000 452710 
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4.2 Current tax regulation for private entities  
The current regulation for taxation of private entities is stated in the Income Tax Act (SFS 
1999:1229). Current legislation states that the owner of a private entity cannot bring up a salary 
for him/her as a cost during the year within the business, thus the earnings are the result of the 
private entity (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §3). It is also stated that a private entity is not an 
independent taxable unit, the income is instead taxed at the individual level, that is to say the 
owner and in some cases the owner's spouse or partner (SKV 295, 2016). Due to this, the result 
of a private entity is therefore taxed with a progressive tax rate, as for an individual with income 
of labor. 
 
Further, on, there are several different deposition possibilities for private entities in order to 
postpone the payment of taxes, such as allocation funds, expansion funds, interest depositions, 
forest and forest damage accounts, and authorship account. These deposition possibilities are all 
defined by specific regulations and calculated in various ways. 
4.2.1 Allocation fund 
A private entity has the possibility to allocate up to 30 % of their result before taxes to an 
allocation fund (SFS 1999:1229, ch.30, §6), and has the opportunity to postpone the taxation up 
to six years after the allocation has been made (SFS 1999:1229, ch.30, §7). If the result is 
negative in the company one year, it has the possibility to withdrawal a part of the allocation 
fund in order to even out the result (SKV 295). The deposition does not need to be placed into a 
bank account; instead, it is available for usage in the company's assets (SKV 295).  
4.2.2 Expansion fund 
An expansion fund is a deposition possibility for private 
entities to place a part of their capital in a fund that 
will be taxed with 22 % (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §8).  
The expansion fund was implemented in order to make 
the conditions between a private entity and an 
incorporated company similar, since the expansion fund 
is taxed with the same tax rate as an incorporated 
company - 22 % (SFS 1999:1229, ch.65, §8).  
 
 
The highest possible deposition to an expansion fund is 128,21 % of the company's capital base, 
which can be described as the difference between assets and liabilities (SFS 1999:1229, 
ch.34, §6), and it can also not be higher than the adjusted profit  (SFS 1999:1229, ch.34, §4). The 
deposition limit of 128.21 % of the capital base implies that the remaining deposition after tax 
payment will be the same as the income, see the example in table 6. 
  
The expansion fund does not have a time limit, in comparison with other deposition possibilities, 
although there are some circumstances that will require a return of the capital from the fund. 
Each year a capital base has to be calculated, and if the existing means in the fund exceeds the 
capital base, then no further depositions can be made (SFS 1999:1229, ch.34). If the business is 
terminated or liquidated, the capital has to been brought back (SFS 1999:1229, ch.34, §16).  
Example max deposition 
 
Income:   100 000 
Max deposition  128 210 
 
Tax (22% x 128 210)  -28 210  
 
Remaining deposition 100 000 
 
Table 6 Example expansion fund (SKV 295, own 
processing) 
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4.2.3 Interest allocations  
Interest allocation can both be positive and negative, and is a tool that allows the company to 
move capital between two types of income - income of business and income of capital (SFS 
1999:1229, ch.33, §2). To estimate to what extent allocations can be made the capital base has to 
be calculated (SFS 1999:1229, ch.33, §8).   
  
If the capital base is positive, the company has the 
opportunity to make a positive interest allocation, 
thus move capital from income of business to 
income of capital (SFS 1999:1229, ch.33, §2) and 
pay a lower tax rate of 30 % (SFS 1999:1229, 
ch.65, §8). In order to estimate the extent of the 
allocation the capital base is multiplied with the 
government-borrowing rate enumerated with 6 % 
(SFS 1999:1229, ch.33, §3), the achieved number 
is the highest possible allocation. A positive 
interest allocation is voluntary (SFS 1999:1229, 
ch.33, §6).  
 
 
The case can also be the other way around when 
there is a negative capital base. When this occurs, 
the company has to move capital from income of 
capital to taxation in income of business (SFS 
1999:1229, ch.33, §2). To estimate the allocation 
the negative capital base is multiplied with the 
government borrowing rate enumerated with 1 % 
(SFS 1999:1229, ch.33, §3).   
  
 
 
 
4.2.4 Forest accounts and forest damage accounts  
Forest accounts and forest damage accounts are deposition possibilities for NIPF landowners, 
which allow them to postpone taxation of a part of their income from deforestation by making 
depositions into a credit institution (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21, §21). The NIPF landowner may only 
make one deposition to a forest account for each year (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21, §32), and the 
deposition may not cause a deficit within the company (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21, §30). The 
deposition has to be at least 5 000 SEK for a forest account, and 50 000 SEK for a forest damage 
account (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21, §31). 
 
A withdrawal from a forest account can be implemented at the earliest four months after 
deposition, with a lowest amount of 1 000 SEK (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21, §36). The deposition has 
to be withdrawn after a maximum of ten years for forest accounts, and twenty years for forest 
damage accounts (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21, §36). Withdrawals from the accounts should be 
brought up for taxation the current year the withdrawals are made (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21 §37). 
 
Example positive interest allocation 
 
Capital  base   1 000 000 
Income of business     300 000 
 
Possible allocation 
(1 000 000 x 6.90 %)       69 000 
 
Income of business  
(300 000-69 000)      231 000 
Income of capital        69000
  
Example negative interest allocation 
Capital  base  - 1 000 000 
Income of business       300 000 
Income of capital        100 000 
 
Possible allocation 
(1 000 000 x 1,90 %)         19 000 
 
Income of business   
(300 000 + 19 000)       319 000 
Income of capital 
(100 000 – 19 000)         81 000 
Table 7 Example positive interest allocation (SKV 295, own 
processing) 
Table 8 Example negative interest allocation (SKV 295, 
own processing) 
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Depositions to forest accounts are regulated depending on what type of product the forest owner 
has sold. Depositions into a forest account can be done as follows (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21 §25):  
 
• Felling rights - 60 % of the income  
• Shipping timber - 40 % of the income   
• Extractions of forest products - 40 % of the income  
  
Depositions into a forest damage account can be done as follows (SFS 1999:1229, ch.21 §26):  
 
• Felling rights - 80 % of the income  
• Shipping timber - 50 % of the income   
• Extractions of forest products - 50 % of the income  
 
4.3 SOU 2014:68 – Simplified taxation regulation for private entities 
The SOU 2014:68 investigation was initiated by the Swedish government in 2012, with the aim 
to evaluate and simplify current tax regulation for private entities. The reason for which this 
investigation was initiated was the desire to achieve a neutralization of the corporate tax frame 
for private companies, regardless whether it is a corporation or a private entity (SOU 2014:68, p. 
71). Today, there are some differences depending on the type of business undertaken. For 
instance, there are different possibilities to make depositions, where a private entity has some 
advantages upon a corporation (SOU 2014:68).  
 
Within the current regulation for private entities, there are five different possibilities to do 
allocations - allocation fund, expansion fund, the forestry and forest damage account, and the 
authorship account (SOU 2014:68, p. 117). These depositions have different legislations, stating 
how they should be done in a certain order and be withdrawn for taxation in various timeframes. 
The investigation points out that this system is unnecessary complicated for the private entity, 
and therefore a simplification may be needed (SOU 2014:68).  
 
SOU 2014:68 highlights a certain complex issue with the current legislation, the fact that some of 
the different deposition possibilities are depending on each other. A deposition for an allocation 
fund is to be done after the interest allocation, and a deposition to the expansion fund is to be 
done after both of them (SOU 2014:68). In the investigation, they argue that some of these 
deposition possibilities are not fully utilized, and the main argument for this is lack of 
knowledge.  
  
To deal with these variances between the different types of business, the investigation presents a 
proposal for changes in the tax legislation. Their proposal is to remove the current deposition 
possibilities, and replace it with one deposition possibility - a business fund (SOU 2014:68, p. 
122). In the business fund, only earnings within the company should be used as a base for 
depositions, similar to the praxis of current expansion fund (SOU 2014:68, p.23). It is also 
suggested that this business fund should not have a timeframe for when the depositions should be 
withdrawn for taxation, instead they propose there should be compulsory tax rate on the capital 
placed in the business fund (SOU 2014:68), which could be compared with the legislation for 
allocation funds for incorporated companies (SFS 1999:1229 ch.30, §6a).   
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The business fund should have similar rules as the expansion fund, where the possible deposition 
is calculated for each year, where the capital base states how big the total deposition can be 
(SOU 2014:68). The investigation propose that the business fund should have its base in the 
company's profit, initial with the dispensable income (SOU 2014:68, p.144.). It is suggested that 
40 % of the dispensable income should be available for deposition to the business fund (SOU 
2014:68, p.125) This will, according to the investigation, simplify the paper work for private 
entities, and the conditions between corporate businesses and private entities should be more 
alike (SOU 2014:68, p.125.).   
 
In the current legislation, a capital base is used to calculate several depositions. Although, 
different methods to calculate the capital base are used depending on what deposition it concerns. 
This is unnecessary confusing according to the investigation, since the different capital bases are 
quite similar to each other, but still contains some differences (SOU 2014:68, p.128). Due to this, 
it is suggested in the investigation that there should be one joint capital base for the remaining 
business fund and interest allocation (SOU 2014:68, p.128).  
4.4 The studied private entities 
Three different private entities were selected for this study, all with different characteristics, but 
with the common denominator – they all fall within the category of NIPF landowners. It was 
desirable to have different characteristics of the companies, in order to provide a broader view of 
the consequences of SOU 2014:68 in the future.  
 
The only information received for this study is their accounting and the fact that they own forest, 
otherwise there is little to say, except what can be read from the accountings. In the accountings, 
it is possible to see two companies are larger than the third in their turnover, where the third has a 
significant smaller turnover. In addition, it is possible to see that one of the two bigger companies 
has a greater impact from the forest than the other. This is because half of the company's revenue 
can be attributable to the forest.  4.4.1 Company one 
Company one (C1) has an average turnover of 3 023 383 SEK, where the forest makes up for 6 
% of the revenue. C1 harvest three out of six years, which implies that the turn over connected to 
forest varies over the years. What distinguish C1 is that their main income source is not their 
forest, instead they have another main income source for which no information has been 
provided about. In addition, it is a very profitable company delivering a positive result every 
year.  The size of the company implies that the owner has it as his/her main occupation. 4.4.2 Company two 
Company two (C2) has a turnover, on average: 4 199 598 SEK and 52 % of the revenue is from 
disforestation. C2 harvest each year in the provided information, and it is shown that forest plays 
a crucial part for the company. The profitability of C2 is not stable, it shifts from a negative 
result of a couple hundred thousand to a positive result of several hundred thousand. Even 
considering the volatile result of the company, the size still implies that the owner has it as their 
main occupation. 4.4.3 Company three 
Company three (C3) only has revenues attributable to forest, thus 100 % of the revenue is from 
disforestation. However, the company has much lower turnover than previous companies, with 
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an average of 95 769 SEK. In addition, it seems like they are implementing large reforestations 
through the received years, which consequently lowers the result, and some years below zero. C3 
is also not assumed to have the company as their main income source, due to the size.  
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5 RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
Following chapter will present the received results from the Monte Carlo simulations, combined 
with an analysis that illuminates the results from the theoretical framework. The simulations will 
described as possible outcomes for C1, C2 and C3 and show differences from current tax 
legislation and the proposed changes in SOU 2014:68. 
5.1 Summation of the results 
In table 9, the results for all the companies and the different future scenarios are presented. The C 
is representing the result before taxes for the simulated time-period. Since there will be less 
possibilities to make depositions the value of C will increase. This will in turn affect the amount 
of paid taxes, T. D stands for the balance of untaxed assets at the end of the simulated time-
period, and the total profit, TP, is the summation of the results after depositions and taxes for the 
simulated time-period.  
 
Table 9 Summary of the results from the simulation, (own processing) 
 
5.2 Company one  
For C1 accountings was received from 2010-2014, and the simulations were done for the 
upcoming seven years. By the received accountings, it can be inferred that C1 has their main 
income based in another income source than the forest, as the forest-based revenue consists of 
only 6 % of the total revenue in the company. C1 is assumed to harvest three out of five years, 
which will be years with higher forest based revenues. The mean result for C1 in the simulation 
is 6 175 708.82 SEK, with a s.d. of 482 472.58 SEK. As C1 only shows positive results in the 
Company 1 Comapny 2 Company 3
C C5-C12 C5-C12 C5-C12
Current legislation 2 727 177,06   2 037 949,91   28 610,25     
SOU 2014:68 4 485 534,07   2 443 025,39   215 802,80   
64% 20% 654%
D D5-D12 D5-D12 D5-D12
Current legislation 3 933 786,54   959 285,65      218 635,26   
SOU 2014:68 1 179 100,00   358 100,00      -                  
-70% -63% -100%
T T5-T12 T5-T12 T5-T12
Current legislation 1 487 258,38   618 267,81      9 847,90       
SOU 2014:68 2 003 340,34   834 334,20      110 774,66   
35% 35% 1025%
Total profit TP5-TP12 TP5-TP12 TP5-TP12
Current legislation 5 173 705,21   2 378 967,75   237 397,62   
SOU 2014:68 3 661 293,73   1 966 791,19   105 028,14   
-29% -17% -56%
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received accountings, C1 can be seen as a stabile company, with even results throughout the 
years.  The minimum result is 4 379 275.94 SEK and the maximum result is 7 911 876.49 SEK. 
In the cumulative distribution curve in figure 6 it can be inferred that 90 % of the possible future 
results before taxation will be between 5 383 000 and 6 961 000 SEK. 
 
 
Figure 6 Cumulative distribution curve for C1 (own processing) 
C1 is a profitable company that presents positive results each year and use several deposition 
possibilities in order to lower the result before taxes, as seen in Appendix 1. The effects of the 
proposed changes by SOU 2014:68 is shown in Appendix 2. For the simulated time-period they 
present a result before taxes and after depositions, C, of 2 727 177.06 SEK, compared to the C 
with the proposed changes that is 4 485 534.07 SEK, which is an increase of 64 %. This is 
resulting in a higher tax burden, from 1 487 258.38 SEK to 2 003 340.34 SEK. As a larger 
amount of money is used for tax payments the total profit for the simulated time period is 
decreasing with 29 %, and differs between 5 173 705,21 SEK to 3 661 293,73 SEK, leaving less 
assets left within the company. 
 
C1 has the goal to obtain an even result of 276 000 SEK before taxes, as the NIPF landowners is 
assumed to have the company as its main occupation. This is not possible even with the current 
legislation, since the company makes high positive results each year. C1 does not have any years 
with a negative result, so there are no reasons to withdrawal untaxed assets in order to even out 
results. However, the company has fluctuations over the years and with the current system C1 
has more possibilities to distribute its income. The untaxed assets, D, differs between current 
legislation and SOU 2014:68. D will decrease with 70 %, which is mainly due to the deregulation 
of all the deposition possibilities, not only the forest account. 
 
Even if it is not possible to bring the result down to 276 000 SEK with the current legislation, the 
result is still kept low in order to avoid a progressive tax rate. C1 still exceeds governmental tax 
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thresholds in some years, but with the proposed changes in SOU 2014:68 the company will 
exceed the governmental tax thresholds in each year except one. This is the main cause of the 
increased tax burden, as the company is facing a tax rate of 57 % in four of the simulated years. 
This is a concern, as Aronsson (1990) argues that the overall supply of roundwood will shift 
negatively as the progressivity of the tax rate increases. Aronsson (1990) argues that NIPF 
landowners will receive utility from consumption, meaning that the result after subtracting costs, 
depositions, savings and taxes is available for consumption. Therefore, when C1 is facing a 
greater progressivity it is reasonable to argue that the company's incentives to harvest their forest 
will decrease. 
 
Since the forest does not play a crucial part for the company's economy, a possible outcome of 
the deregulation of the forest account could be that the NIPF landowner evaluate alternative 
usage for the forest, such as non-timber activities (Conway et al., 2003; Bolkesjø & Baardsen, 
2001). As the NIPF landowners are assumed to act according to profit maximization behavior 
(Aronsson, 1990; Fortney et al., 2011), it can be argued that when conditions are deteriorated it 
will not be interesting for the NIPF landowner to obtain their harvest of forest.  
5.3 Company two   
For C2 accountings were received for 2012-2015, and the future simulation was conducted 
through @RISK for the eight upcoming years. In C2, the forest-based revenue has a significant 
impact on the company, where it represent for 52 % of the turnover. In the accountings it is 
shown that the forest-based revenue is even over years, which implies that harvesting takes place 
each year. It has therefore been assumed in the simulation that C2 will harvest in all of the 
simulated years. In the simulations the result before depositions and taxes oscillates between –71 
359 SEK and 848 022 SEK, which implies that C2 is a company with volatile results. C2 is 
assumed to have their business as its main occupation, and the depositions will therefore be done 
in order to receive a result before taxes of 276 000 SEK. The simulation for C2 with current 
legislation is shown in Appendix 3, including all possible depositions. As there is a large forest 
based revenue, the possible deposition to the forest account is enough to bring the result down to 
276 000 SEK, and therefore no other depositions are used.   
 
In figure 7 the cumulative distribution curve show possible future outcome for C2 and sums up 
the results with a mean scenario of 2 751 373 SEK. As mentioned, C2 is described as a company 
with volatile results, which can be inferred from figure 7, where it shows that 90 % of the 
possible future results will be between –4 830 000 SEK and 10 940 000 SEK. The minimum 
result for the simulated time-period is –13 145 398.69 SEK while the maximum is 23 003 719.40 
SEK. 
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Figure 7 Cumulative distribution curve for C2 (own processing) 
The depositions to the forest account are used fully for C2 in the simulation with current 
legislation, which gives a result before taxes, C, of 2 037 949.91 SEK. For the same period, 618 
267.81 SEK has been paid in taxes. The balance for the untaxed assets in the final year is 959 
285.65 SEK, by adding C with D, reduced by T a total value of 2 378 967-75 SEK is obtained, 
which is equivalent to the total profit, TP. 
 
If C2 would face the proposed changes from SOU 2014:68 it would involve changed deposition 
possibilities, where the business fund would allow less deposition possibilities. In C2 the 
deposition possibility is pending between 0 and 339 200 SEK, because it is accounted on the 
result, and not the revenue, see Appendix 4. Although C2 has great fluctuations in the revenue, 
they can still bring up 276 000 as a result to be taxed for the majority of the years and have 
positive balance in their untaxed funds. With the proposed changes, C2 will be affected 
negatively in terms of planning, as C2 will have less funds to be distributed in years with low 
revenue or high costs. The TP for C2 will decrease with 17 %, from 2 378 967.75 SEK to 1 966 
791.19 SEK, leaving the company with less funds to distribute. 
 
C2 has a much more uncertain future than C1 and can therefore be assumed to have greater need 
to plan the revenue. As mentioned, the current tax structure allows for larger deposition 
possibilities, which in this case is equivalent to better planning possibilities. When considering 
strategic decisions, risk is a great factor that determines the decision (Brealey et al., 2011; 
Hardaker et al., 2015), in this case the decision regarding harvesting. The CDC show a great 
uncertainty, which is associated with high risk.  In order to reduce the risk for C2 forest account 
and depositions possibilities are helpful tools. When substituted to the business fund the ability to 
plan decreases, and the risk of less profitable results from harvest increases. This may result in 
relocated time to a less volatile income source, and may change the forest management. 
 
30 
 
 
 
In the case with the current legislation C2 is able to keep an even result around 276 000 SEK 
each year, but when facing the proposed changes through SOU 2014:68 the company will 
increase their revenue for some of the years. C2 will also be facing the effect of the progressive 
tax rate, as the company exceeds the limit for progressive tax rate in one year. Even if C2 only 
reaches the first governmental tax threshold, the company will still with a 52 % tax rate for a part 
of the result. As mentioned for C1, the same outcome and argument is valid for C2 regarding tax 
progressivity.  
5.4 Company three 
The accountings for 2010-2013 were received for C3, and the simulation has been done for the 
upcoming eight years. C3 is the company with the lowest revenue in the study. It only has forest-
based revenue. Due to this, C3 is assumed to have the firm as an ancillary business, and receiving 
a salary from a job outside the company. As it is assumed that owner already have an income, 
depositions are done in order to bring the result down to 0 SEK to avoid tax thresholds. 
 
The forest activities in C3 differs over the years, where harvesting occurs in one year, 
reforestration in another, and the remaining years are seen as middle years with low activity in 
the forest. Due to this, the study have simulated harvest years, planting years and middle years in 
order to present a reliable future scenario. For example, the years 2014 and 2018 are seen as 
harvest years with high revenue from forest, while 2016 and 2020 are years with reforestration, 
where the costs are significantly higher. Figure 8 show the CDC for C3, where it can be inferred 
that the maximum value for C is 364 3658 SEK, minimum value is –372 171 SEK, and with a 
mean value of 26 837 SEK. The s.d. for C3 is 99 676.49 SEK, which is at the same level as for 
C1 and C2, seen to their possible outcomes. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Cumulative distribution curve for C3 (own processing) 
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With the current legislation, C3 has the possibility to set the result to 0 SEK almost every year 
when applying depositions to forest account and allocation fund. With the business fund the case 
will somewhat change. With current legislation C3 will present a C of 28 610.25 SEK, but with 
the business fund it will be 215 802.80 SEK. This increase in C will lead to an increase in T, 
where it shifts from 9 847.90 SEK to 110 774.66 SEK. This is the largest percentage increase in 
T, with 1025 %, and can be explained by the fact that C3 has the opportunity to report a result 
close to 0 SEK with the current legislation, and will therefore have a low tax burden.  
 
The balance in D with the current legislation is 218 635.26 SEK, which is used to even out the 
result during planting years. Although, when facing the business fund there will not be enough 
means in order to do this, and the balance of D will be 0 SEK. The TP of C3 will decrease with 
56 % from 237 397.62 SEK to 105 028.14 SEK, which also is the largest percentage decrease of 
the TP in this study. It should be stressed that the received results for C3 are extreme because C3 
has a desirable result of 0 SEK. Therefore, the percentage change is higher than with the other 
companies in the study. 
 
C3 is an example where the proposed changes comes with a price. Krott (2010) argues for the 
importance of bringing together science and reality when forming new policies. For C3 it can be 
questioned if it is realistic to enforce a new tax structure that would increase the tax burden with 
over 1000 %, without stressing that the reform will have a significant impact on the industry. 
5.5 Forest management 
Neoclassical theory suggests that firms make rational decisions, based on how to maximize their 
profit (Rubinfeld & Pindyck, 2012). This, combined with studies showing that NIPF landowners 
have diverse interests how to manage the forest (Conway et al., 2003; Bolkesjø & Baardsen, 
2001), could have a negative impact on the willingness to manage the forest for production of 
wood products. SOU 2014:68 will, according to this study, have negative effect on the planning 
possibilities for NIPF landowners. A possible consequence is that some NIPF landowners in 
Sweden will redistribute their time, focus on other income sources, as the forest will no longer 
profitable enough to use for production of wood, as Conway et al., (2003) finds that NIPF 
landowners that has another occupation tend to spend less time on forest management. 
5.6 Policy theory analysis 
Policy theory helps to understand the role of governmental interference with the market, 
specifically how to target tax on forest growth and harvest to reach long-term profits with a 
sustainable production from an environmental perspective (Amacher, 1997; Krott, 2012; Fortney 
et al., 2011). Boyd and Hyde (1989) argue for how governmental interventions can hinder 
optimal market conditions, with the exceptions if the policy aims to redistribute fund for welfare 
purposes or is used to correct market failures. The thesis can confirm that the studied NIPF 
landowners would add to more tax funds to the government with the business fund, which would 
contribute to additional funds for the welfare systems in Sweden.  
 
Although, the welfare system might seem to benefit from the reformed tax structures, this may 
not be the case. As mentioned the production of wood products in Sweden has lately been 
stagnating. They could be better of letting their forest grow, in order to increase the property 
value or leaving it to next coming generation as bequest, similar to Conway et al., (2003) 
findings on NIPF landowner’s behavior. If stagnation in the industry already can be observed, 
32 
 
 
 
and on top this harvesting wood becomes even less profitable a possible consequence is 
continued stagnation and possible short-term deficit of wood, which would result in less tax 
revenue and less economic growth.    
 
Amacher (1997) states that governments face constraints when designing tax policies for the 
forest industry, and one of the constraints is that policies are rarely changed in isolation for a 
certain industry or a product. The isolation benefit can be seen as tool to even out difference 
between certain sectors. Swedish NIPF landowners are benefiting from an isolation benefit 
through the forest account. By allowing NIPF landowners distribute their income over several 
years when harvesting their forest gives the NIPF landowner an isolation benefit compared to 
other sectors. With the proposed changes in SOU 2014:68 this isolation benefit will be 
deregulated, and the forest industry with unique characteristics will be seen as any other industry. 
From Amacher (1997) perspective forest accounts can be seen as a way to hinder market 
distortion by changing tax policies in isolation, the deregulation of forest accounts can be seen as 
a step in the wrong direction when designing optimal tax policies. 
5.7 Incorporation of practical issues in new policies 
Previous studies show that when designing new policies there are often a lack of knowledge of 
the reality, that the policies are often based on theoretical frameworks with assumptions that does 
not reflect the real world properly (Krott, 2012). SOU 2014:68 purposes to regulate the current 
tax structure for all private entities, without stressing how the changes will affect specific sectors, 
such as the forest sector. NIPF landowners are forced to adapt to the changes, as they cannot 
change the structure of the firm, due to Swedish legislation concerning ownership of estates (see 
SFS 1979: 230). Therefore, it can be reasonable to argue that more information and knowledge 
about the actual impact for the NIPF landowners should be incorporated when designing the new 
tax structure suggested in SOU 2014:68. In line with this, Krott (2012) argues that better 
information concerning forest politics would provide a greater overview of the actual 
consequences that specific policies and regulations will have on the NIPF landowners. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
SOU 2014:68 has the aim to evaluate and simplify current tax regulation for private entities 
(SOU 2014:68, p.3). When the results of the investigation were presented in 2014, they 
introduced the proposed change – to replace current legislation with a new type of deposition, the 
business fund. Instead of having five different deposition possibilities, all with different rules, the 
investigation suggest that private entities should only have one deposition in order to make it less 
complicated. According to the study, SOU 2014:68 will have a negative effect on the planning 
possibilities for NIPF landowners, as the forest account has historically been used as a tool to 
even out the result over a longer period. Nevertheless, we must stress that the results from this 
study should be read with caution, as the study only has been looking at three different NIPF 
landowners. If the study had been conducted on another set of data, for example private entities 
without forest as an income source, the difference between current tax structure and the business 
fund would have been less, as forest account only is a deposition possibility for NIPF 
landowners. 
 
For companies that are facing different results over the years, having high revenues during 
harvesting years and high costs during planting years, the forest account provides a planning tool 
to control the result of the company in a greater extent. It can be questioned if the investigation 
has taken the complexity of the sector into account when formulating the proposed changes. It 
can seem reasonable to have the forest account as a planning tool, as it can take 70-120 years to 
produce a final product from the forest (Fortney et al., 2010).  
 
Even if it is assumed that one deposition possibility will be easier to handle than five, the study 
shows that the companies will have less means left in the business as the taxes increases. A 
possible consequence of SOU 2014:68 is that some NIPF landowners will redistribute their time 
to focus on another income sources, as the forest will no longer be as profitable to use for 
production of wood. This could lead to less well-managed forests, and a decrease in the supply of 
Swedish forest products. Instead, the likeliness that forests will be used for other purposes 
increases, such as non-timber activities or leaving it as a bequest for the next generation. 
 
What can be questioned is if this a matter of communication, SOU 2014:68 aims to simplify the 
tax declaration process for private entities without having any emphasis on gaining more tax 
income. From our results it can be interpreted that NIPF landowners will be taxed more, and 
consequently contribute to a higher tax income for the government. If the investigation would 
have been clear that the purpose was to further extend welfare funds in Sweden, the logic of the 
changes would be clearer.  
6.1 Further research 
Much of what has been studied in policy theory becomes evident in this study. For instance, 
when designing new policies it can be vital to create or keep isolation policies in order to 
increase production of a certain output. For the future, it can be of interest to study how these 
isolating factors should be taken into account when designing governmental policies in the forest 
sector. In addition, the study has only compared different results and provides potential 
outcomes, but does not find equilibriums between tax paid by NIPF landowners and funds for a 
government to provide welfare. Future studies could try to find equilibriums where the tax 
motivates NIPF landowners enough to keep the supply of wood steady, and is taxed fairly if 
compared to similar industries. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to examine how a potential reform in the tax structure, following the 
investigation SOU 2014:68, may affect NIPF landowners. Once analyzed three different types of 
NIPF landowners, we observe that these companies may be affected negatively by a reform. In 
contrast, the government may collect higher tax revenue, which can be used for welfare-
enhancing activities. Nevertheless, it is also clear that lower profits may deter any incentive by 
NIPF landowners in terms of business expansion. 
 
There is a risk that the overall supply of forest products in Sweden may decrease if NIPF 
landowners would face the new tax program, as their total profit will decrease. If it becomes less 
profitable to harvest the forest, it can be argued that other uses, such as using the forest for non-
timber services or leaving it as a bequest for the next generation, may become more attractive. 
The study argues that there is a lack of understanding how governmental policies will affect 
companies in practice. Thus, the need to merge theory and practice within the forest sector is still 
a relevant challenge. 
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